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Risk management in the water utility sector is becoming increasingly explicit.  However, 2 
due to the novelty and complexity of the discipline, utilities are encountering difficulties in 3 
defining and institutionalising their risk management processes.  In response, the authors 4 
have developed a sector specific capability maturity methodology for benchmarking and 5 
improving risk management.  The research, conducted in consultation with water utility 6 
practitioners, has distilled risk management into a coherent, process-based framework.  We 7 
identified eleven risk management processes, and eight key attributes with characterise the 8 
extent to which these processes are defined, controlled and institutionalised.  9 
Implementation of the model should enable utilities to more effectively employ their 10 
portfolio of risk analysis techniques for optimal, credible and defensible decision making. 11 
 12 










1. Introduction 1 
Financial restrictions, regulatory pressures and sectoral restructuring are encouraging 2 
water utilities to move from technically inclined, risk-averse management approaches 3 
towards more commercial, business-oriented practices (MacGillivray et al., 2006a).  Many 4 
within the industry, spurred on by developments in international regulation and guidance, 5 
are promoting a business-wide approach to risk management as a means to ease and exploit 6 
this transition (e.g. Lifton and Smeaton, 2003; Miller, 2005; Lloyd and Abell, 2005).  7 
Whilst the sector has made good progress towards setting its stated goal (AWWA et al., 8 
2001) of providing wholesome, safe drinking water that has the trust of customers within a 9 
risk-based context (Pollard et al., 2004), there remain barriers to the implementation of risk 10 
management.  These can be categorised as business-related, the challenge of embedding 11 
risk management within organisational cultures and decision-making processes (e.g. 12 
Pollard et al., 2004; Howard and Lourens, 2005); and technical, relating to the selection and 13 
application of risk analysis tools (e.g. MacGillivray et al., 2006a).  Our research addresses 14 
the former; the premise being that the tools and techniques for risk analysis are sufficiently 15 
developed, yet lacking is the organisational capacity to employ these methodologies for 16 
more optimal, credible, and defensible decision-making. 17 
The authors propose that the dominant cause of this capacity deficiency is the 18 
difficulty inherent in establishing, defining and controlling risk management processes.  19 
This is perhaps because the sector’s approach to implementation has centred on adherence 20 
to risk management frameworks.  These are essentially standards describing the 21 
fundamentals of the prior art and the interrelationships between its core elements (e.g. 22 
Hamilton et al., 2006).  Here, we are not concerned with frameworks for drinking water 23 
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quality management (e.g. NHMRC, 2001; WHO, 2002), widely accepted and applied 1 
within the sector as a means of placing public health protection within a risk-based context, 2 
but with those corporate-level frameworks intended to foster an integrated approach to risk 3 
management (e.g. COSO, 2004; Canadian Standards Association, 1997; Council of 4 
Standards of Australia, 1999).  These latter frameworks have been instrumental in 5 
transforming the discipline from the preserve of engineering and finance functions towards 6 
a business-wide paradigm.  However, a number of criticisms may be offered.  Critically, 7 
although they typically embrace the concept that risk management is comprised of 8 
processes, their treatment of the discipline focuses on organisational structures and 9 
procedures.  They often fail to address how the core tasks and activities of risk management 10 
may be defined and controlled as processes.  Furthermore, although they have evolved 11 
beyond prescribing static requirements towards embracing the concept of continuous 12 
improvement, too often this is addressed as an afterthought rather than as an explicit 13 
component of these frameworks.  As such, the water sector has lacked methodologies on 14 
which to base risk management improvement initiatives, suggesting that enhancements may 15 
often be isolated and that their associated benefits can neither be replicated nor extended 16 
throughout organisations.  Finally, whilst typically generic in nature, these frameworks are 17 
often representative of the large, financially-oriented firms where their application 18 
predominates. 19 
To address these shortcomings, the authors have developed a sector-specific risk 20 
management capability maturity model (RM-CMM), a vehicle for benchmarking, 21 
implementing and improving the processes that comprise risk management.  In this paper 22 
we review the field of capability maturity modelling.  We then describe the research 23 
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methodology adopted in the design of our model, before discussing its development, 1 
structure and practical definition.  A companion manuscript (MacGillivray et al., 2006b) 2 
describes the model’s application in a benchmarking of eight utilities within the 3 
international water sector. 4 
 5 
2. Risk management in the water sector 6 
The water industry is undergoing a significant shift in its approach to risk 7 
management to one that is increasingly explicit and better integrated with other business 8 
processes.  Risk management strategies and techniques traditionally applied to occupational 9 
health and safety and public health protection are now seeing broader application for asset 10 
management (Booth and Rogers, 2001; Lifton and Smeaton, 2003), watershed protection 11 
(IMPRESS Management, 2002; NHMRC, 2001; WHO, 2003) and network operation (Stahl 12 
and Elliott, 1999; Stevens and Lloyd, 2004).  Beyond this operational context, utility 13 
managers are increasingly concerned with managing the risks inherent to corporate level 14 
decision making.  Critical issues include decisions on outsourcing asset maintenance; 15 
billing and monitoring; the management of change; staff retention; the long-term viability 16 
of investment decisions; and the management of external interfaces with regulators and 17 
“competing” utilities (MacGillivray et al., 2006a).  Pollard et al. (2004) report that the 18 
organisational hierarchy that exists even within “flat” utilities requires that these risks are 19 
actively managed at strategic, programme and operational levels (Fig. 1).  Typically, there 20 
are split accountabilities for these risks such that the chief financial officer / financial 21 
director and Board have overall responsibility, supported by an internal audit or control 22 
function for the management of strategic risks; executive and senior management address 23 
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programme level risks (e.g. asset management, maintenance planning); and operational 1 
(e.g. site) managers bear responsibility for operational risks (e.g. treatment plant 2 
performance).   3 
Water utilities must employ a range of techniques to evaluate and consider these 4 
aspects alongside one another, devising business and operating strategies that prioritise 5 
resources on the basis of risk.  Here tensions may arise from the explicit risk trade-offs 6 
inherent to running a commercial water utility, such that the industry’s overarching goal of 7 
public health protection is placed in conflict with narrower financial interests.  Critically in 8 
this regard, the transition to an explicit risk management philosophy within the sector is 9 
reflected in recent revisions to the World Health Organisation’s (WHO, 2003) Guidelines 10 
for Drinking Water Quality.  It is this overall context that drives the need for an increased 11 
capability to manage risk. 12 
 13 
3. Overview of capability maturity modelling 14 
A capability maturity model (CMM) is a simplified representation of an 15 
organisational discipline (e.g. software engineering, risk management) that distils industry 16 
practices into a coherent, process-based framework.  These models are constructed 17 
according to maturity levels, from learner to best practice, which are characterised by the 18 
extent to which the processes are defined, controlled and institutionalised.  The field’s 19 
origins can be traced to the “quality revolution” of the 1970s (e.g. Crosby, 1979) and to the 20 
field of management performance measurement.  The CMM methodology was first 21 
articulated by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), whose seminal model (Paulk et al., 22 
1993) explored the design capability of software development organisations.  The 23 
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capability maturity modelling concept is finding increasing acceptance in academia and 1 
industry.  Notable applications include software and systems engineering (Paulk et al., 2 
1993; Software Engineering Institute, 2002a), workforce development and management 3 
(Software Engineering Institute, 2002b), offshore design safety (Sharp et al., 2002), 4 
reliability engineering (Strutt, 2003), and construction (Sarshar et al., 2000).    Capability 5 
models enable organisations to establish their current level of process maturity and identify 6 
the steps necessary to progress to a higher level, building on their strengths and improving 7 
on their weaknesses.  They may be used for benchmarking purposes, enabling organisations 8 
to compare themselves against other companies in their sector and beyond.  This may be 9 
done at the corporate, functional or business unit level.  Similarly, they may be used to 10 
assess the capabilities of key suppliers and partners. 11 
Recently, a selection of risk management capability maturity models (e.g. IACCM, 12 
2003; RMRDP, 2002) have been developed.  We believe that these models insufficiently 13 
reflect the basic principles of capability maturity modelling.  The most critical point is that 14 
they are not explicitly process-centred.  Furthermore, they do not closely reflect the clear 15 
distinctions between maturity levels as set out by the SEI and developed further by 16 
subsequent researchers, instead characterising risk management maturity on a graded scale 17 
of good-to-bad practice.  Of course, the CMM approach is not the sole means for improving 18 
risk management, and these critiqued models have found support within industry.  Thus, we 19 
do not imply that the IACCM and RMRDP models are without value, indeed their 20 
simplicity and modest time demands may prove attractive to many organisations.  21 
However, our development of the RM-CMM is not an extension of these models, but rather 22 
a novel application of capability maturity modelling to risk management in the water utility 23 
sector.   24 
 8
 1 
4. Rationale of research methodology 2 
The tailoring of existing maturity models to a new discipline and sector is not a 3 
simple mapping exercise (Sarshar et al., 2000).  Here, the core principles of maturity 4 
modelling were abstracted and recreated in a form specific to risk management within the 5 
water utility sector.  Design of the research methodology (Fig. 2) was informed by the 6 
authors’ previous experience in maturity modelling within similar utility sectors and drew 7 
upon the CMM literature, particularly Sarshar et al. (2000).  The methodology is designated 8 
“testing-out research” (Starke, 1995).  Here, the aim is to explore the limits of previously 9 
proposed generalisations and to specify, modify or clarify their content (Starke, 1995).  10 
This form of research must be conducted under real world conditions, where the kind of 11 
control present in laboratory conditions is neither feasible nor justifiable.  The lead author, 12 
in concert with a steering group of four expert practitioners, designed the model in 13 
collaboration with partner water utilities.  Key development inputs included literature 14 
reviews of risk management and capability maturity modelling, structured scoping 15 
interviews with eleven water utility professionals from five countries, prior knowledge of 16 
maturity modelling in similar utility sectors, and past experience within the water sector. 17 
Given the qualitative nature of the research, verification and validation mechanisms 18 
were adopted.  The purpose of the expert steering group was to verify that the model 19 
accurately codified risk management in line with the principles of maturity modelling.  20 
Furthermore, feedback was sought from three water utilities to ensure that the model 21 
reflected the practical realities of managing risk in the sector.  This took the form of one 22 
workshop and two interviews conducted after sharing the pilot model.  This piloting sought 23 
 9
to validate the model’s architecture (e.g. are the right processes included, are they 1 
adequately characterised, are the key attributes relevant, etc.) and to clarify its terminology.  2 
The model remains under research.  The authors have recently tested the model through a 3 
benchmarking exercise and two industrial case studies.  These applications will provide 4 
data of intrinsic value to both the industrial and academic communities, and will serve as a 5 
means for evolving the model towards a state compatible with industrial ownership.   6 
 7 
5. Risk management capability maturity model 8 
5.1 MODEL OVERVIEW 9 
The RM-CMM is designed to measure and improve risk management processes.  10 
Hence it is process-based rather than focussing on specific outcomes or deliverables.  It is 11 
increasingly accepted that continuous process improvement is based on a series of small, 12 
evolutionary steps, rather than revolutionary measures (Paulk et al., 1993).  The RM-CMM 13 
organises these steps within evolutionary plateaus, or maturity levels, which lay successive 14 
foundations for continual process improvement.  Fig. 3 illustrates the model architecture.   15 
 16 
5.2 RISK MANAGEMENT MATURITY LEVELS 17 
Setting sensible goals for process improvement requires an understanding of the 18 
difference between mature and immature organisations (Paulk et al., 1993).  We have 19 
developed descriptions of five maturity levels that characterise organisational behaviours in 20 
both risk management overall and for each constituent process.  These levels were derived 21 
by abstraction from existing CMMs describing different disciplines (Paulk et al., 1993, 22 
Software Engineering Institute, 2002a / 2002b; Sharp et al., 2002; Strutt, 2003; Sarshar et 23 
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al., 2000), contextualisation of which was supported by reviews (MacGillivray et al., 1 
2006a, Pollard et al., 2004; Hamilton et al., 2006) and scoping interviews.  It is important to 2 
understand what these levels represent in practice, as they are central to assessing the 3 
maturity of an organisation.  Below we describe the overarching maturity hierarchy.  Note 4 
that at a given level of maturity, the positive characteristics from preceding levels remain. 5 
 6 
Level 1 – Initial 7 
L1 organisations practice a largely ad hoc approach to risk management, possessing 8 
no formal risk management processes and often exhibiting limited knowledge of relevant 9 
standards or regulatory guidelines.  Thus, they are largely reliant upon individual heroics 10 
for the active management of risk.  L1 organisations are likely to be small water providers 11 
based in isolated rural areas where resource constraints prevent the staffing of utilities with 12 
dedicated water professionals. 13 
 14 
Level 2 – The repeatable organisation 15 
L2 organisations understand that they have risks that require formal management, and 16 
have established basic risk management processes for this purpose.  However, these 17 
processes are ill-defined and poorly institutionalised, limiting their capacity to influence 18 
organisational actions.  Furthermore, the scope of risk management is narrow, generally 19 
restricted to addressing mission-critical risks and areas required by regulation (e.g. 20 
occupational health and safety, water quality).  Hence, at L2 the active management of risk 21 
tends to be influenced less by explicit risk management processes than by the repetition of 22 
activities and practices that have worked for the organisation before.  In a technical context, 23 
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this places a premium on accepted standards of performance and codes of practice (e.g. 1 
engineering standards; accepted best practice) which, if adhered to, provide high degrees of 2 
control.  This is a pragmatic approach in familiar and well-characterised situations where 3 
uncertainties and system vulnerabilities are well understood.   4 
However, this mind set is vulnerable; when mistakes are made they do not learn – 5 
failures are repeated as well as success.  Whilst L2 organisations often have a reputation for 6 
achieving reliable, cost-effective water supply, they are very vulnerable to change, whether 7 
organisational, technical or commercial.  This, allied with deficient organisational learning, 8 
is a common theme across many recent water quality related outbreaks in affluent nations 9 
(Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004).   10 
 11 
Level 3 – The defined organisation 12 
The key characteristic of the L3 organisation is the definition and implementation of 13 
risk management processes across core business areas.  This is achieved through 14 
establishing process “enablers”.  Enablers include the policies, procedures and frameworks 15 
that guide risk management activities (i.e. who does what and when), and the provision of 16 
adequate training, funding and tools in support of these activities.  Several scoping 17 
interviewees described their recent definition of risk management processes.  Drivers for 18 
this included: a desire to balance the role of “brainstorming” and “judgement” in risk 19 
management with more methodological, standardised and objective approaches; the need to 20 
“institutionalise” risk management; and obligations to exhibit good corporate governance to 21 
shareholders and regulators.  In essence, definition seeks to formalise existing implicit 22 
approaches to risk management.  This is most notably illustrated in the sector’s increasing 23 
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adoption of the “water safety plan” approach, which codifies good practice in the 1 
identification, assessment and control of hazards to water quality.   2 
Definition creates an environment in which risks are methodically identified, 3 
analysed, responded to and monitored.  In a technical context, L3 maturity is required 4 
where systems are characterised by greater levels of uncertainty and the potential to deviate 5 
from routine operation.  This is increasingly common, as the trend towards utility self-6 
sufficiency means that management can no longer seek to “over-engineer” facilities with 7 
the presumption of screening out technical risk (MacGillivray et al., 2006a).  Here, 8 
optimisation of plant, network and process design and operation requires a capacity to 9 
assess, understand and respond to what is driving the risk from or to the plant, process or 10 
network.  However, at L3 the efficiency and quality of risk management processes are 11 
variable, stemming from limitations in their verification, validation and feedback 12 
mechanisms (the “evaluators”).  These limitations restrict organisations’ ability to track and 13 
therefore control their risk management processes, which are thus characterised as “open 14 
loop.”   15 
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Level 4 – The controlled organisation 17 
The key characteristic of the L4 organisation is a structure which not only enables 18 
their risk management processes but also evaluates and ensures their effective execution 19 
(closing the open loop of L3).  The scope of these processes reach throughout the 20 
organisational hierarchy and across all functional boundaries.  Evaluating refers to the 21 
implementation of verification and validation mechanisms to provide feedback on the 22 
status, quality, efficiency and expediency of risk management (e.g. ensuring procedural 23 
compliance, quality assurance, benchmarking etc.).  The value of systematic verification 24 
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was emphasised by one scoping interviewee, who noted that previously, free access to the 1 
corporate risk register was combined with an absence of peer review of risk assessments.  2 
This had allowed staff to “over-estimate their own pet concerns” and to assign risk 3 
reduction actions via the register to other staff “unbeknownst to them.”  These deficiencies 4 
were remedied through the introduction of formal procedures governing access and use of 5 
the register and the establishment of challenge procedures to provide quality assurance of 6 
risk assessments.  7 
However, the L4 organisation tends to be hardwired and lacking in internal 8 
flexibility.  This is reflected in that although a learning ethos exists, the manner in which L4 9 
organisations learn is defined as single-loop (Argyris and Schön, 1978).  This refers to 10 
learning where the emphasis is on improving techniques for executing processes, within the 11 
constraints of established process strategies.  In other words, learning is directed towards 12 
making existing process strategies more effective.  Single-loop learning tends to be present 13 
in organisations where goals, values, frameworks and strategies are taken for granted.  This 14 
lack of capacity for deeper learning hampers their ability to make informed risk 15 
management decisions in rapidly changing and uncertain contexts.  Additionally, L4 16 
organisations are often unable to grasp the soft issues associated with human and 17 
organisational behaviour.  This is a core weakness.  18 
 19 
Level 5 – The optimised organisation 20 
The key characteristics of the L5 organisation are its adaptability, flexibility and 21 
attention to human and organisational behaviour.  The L5 mindset is one of deeper 22 
understanding, of an adaptive, learning organisation aiming to be best in class and always 23 
improving in the long term.  Central to this is their capacity for both double (Argyris and 24 
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Schön, 1978) and triple-loop learning.  Double-loop learning involves questioning the 1 
norms, values and assumptions underlying the design of risk management processes, and is 2 
typically found in organisations where risk information is continually developed through a 3 
broad range of channels (e.g. experience, R+D, benchmarking, analysis, simulation, etc.).  4 
This information is openly shared, communicated and used to publicly test assumptions and 5 
beliefs.  We define triple-loop learning as questioning and revising broader organisational 6 
structures and practices to optimise the capability of risk management processes (e.g. 7 
changing incentive structures to encourage knowledge sharing and collaboration between 8 
traditionally competing departments, etc.).  The core enablers of triple-loop learning are an 9 
understanding of how human and organisational behaviour influence process capability, 10 
and organisational flexibility.  L5 organisations are also actively engaged in the innovation, 11 
development and piloting of new ideas and technologies to optimise risk management 12 
throughout the organisation.  From these efforts, best practices are identified and 13 
transferred throughout the organisation.  L5 processes are extremely efficient and there is a 14 
strong risk management culture, because of the long term investments made in developing 15 
processes and in training staff to participate in them.   16 
 17 
5.3 RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 18 
Our research identified 11 risk management processes (Fig. 3).  Strategic risk 19 
planning centres on developing the corporate framework for risk management.  Hamilton et 20 
al. (2006) describe how these frameworks can introduce greater rigour, consistency and 21 
standardisation to the discipline.  The researchers further note their potential for adaptation 22 
to suit “user needs.”  This final point is crucial, as our scoping interviews suggested that 23 
risk management frameworks were not simply shoehorned within utilities.  Establishing 24 
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risk acceptance criteria is perhaps the least understood aspect of risk management.  Whilst 1 
our scoping interviews implied that internally developed criteria for evaluating the 2 
significance of risks were commonplace (risk ranking techniques), prior experience in 3 
similar sectors suggests that tolerability criteria are less prevalent and often externally 4 
imposed (e.g. ALARP criteria for dam safety).  We address both of these aspects in the 5 
context of an internal process, as we propose that both are required to develop responses to 6 
risks in a consistent, objective and defensible manner.  Risk analysis involves the 7 
identification and assessment of risk.  We have previously reviewed (MacGillivray et al., 8 
2006a) its application in the sector at operational, programme and strategic levels.  Here, 9 
our focus is not on the methodologies per se, but on their application.  Supported by 10 
initiation criteria and formal procedures, using personnel with appropriate skills, 11 
experience, and resources, risk analysis techniques can provide utilities with benefits 12 
ranging from an improved understanding of treatment reliability to an explicit appreciation 13 
of project financial risks.  Applied inappropriately, whether due to ill-defined procedures or 14 
deficient institutional capacities, risk analysis is not a subset of risk management but its 15 
panacea.  Our inclusion of risk based decision making examines how organisations identify 16 
and evaluate solutions to manage individual risks.  Clearly, risk analysis is of little use if 17 
the outputs are intended to placate regulators rather than inform decision making.  18 
Furthermore, one interviewee noted that an absence of criteria to evaluate decisions 19 
restricts objectivity (i.e. opinions dominate in decision making), and we further propose 20 
that it prevents the ex ante validation of decisions taken.  Risk response is the 21 
implementation of risk based decisions.  Although an argument may be forwarded that this 22 
lies outside the scope of our model as implementation processes are unlikely to be unique 23 
to risk based decisions (i.e. there will exist models for implementing capital or operational 24 
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solutions, not models for implementing risk based decisions per se), it is included as 1 
decisions left unimplemented are hollow gestures.  The model’s treatment of these latter 2 
two processes is particularly relevant as risk management frameworks have historically 3 
focussed on the identification and assessment of risk, effectively marginalising guidance on 4 
their practical management.  Risk monitoring involves tracking the evolution of identified 5 
risks, and is included in recognition of their dynamic nature.  Integration is the current 6 
focus of the risk management community.  From the literature and our scoping interviews, 7 
two aspects were identified: embedding risk management within organisations; and 8 
enterprise risk management, where risks are managed with reference to the organisation as 9 
a whole, rather than in isolation or in functional silos.  Illustrating the latter aspect, Lam 10 
(2003) contends that the traditional, fragmented approach, where companies manage risk in 11 
organisational “silos,” is ineffective because risks are highly interdependent and cannot be 12 
segmented and managed by entirely independent units. As one  scoping interviewee stated, 13 
“one of the challenges is…when [staff] are all using discrete [risk] tools which may have 14 
different terminologies, scoring systems and ways of presenting the outputs, my role is [to 15 
ensure] is a shared understanding and an ability to interpret the results of tools in a 16 
business-wide context.”  We introduce a third element of integration by abstraction from 17 
the systems engineering CMM (Software Engineering Institute, 2002a): integration of the 18 
risk management process interfaces (e.g. between risk analysis and risk based decision 19 
making).   20 
Supply chain risk management addresses two components: the sourcing of 21 
components required to develop a product (e.g. chemicals) and the management of services 22 
provided by organisations throughout the supply chain.  The latter element is of particular 23 
significance to the sector owing to the increasing utilisation of outsourcing.  However, one 24 
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pilot interviewee challenged the inclusion of product risk, arguing it is effectively managed 1 
through adhering to quality accredited suppliers.  However, it was maintained as the 2 
authors’ prior research in the oil and gas industry indicates that many organisational 3 
failures can be traced back to minor and apparently insignificant services and components 4 
sourced from suppliers.  Change risk management is abstracted from the reliability 5 
engineering CMM (Strutt, 2003), and involves identifying and managing the risk 6 
implications of organisational (e.g. business process re-engineering) and technical change.  7 
We justify its inclusion as a range of factors (e.g. globalisation, regulatory and market 8 
restructuring, novel technologies) are serving to fundamentally alter the context in which 9 
water utilities operate.  Education and training – the development and maintenance of the 10 
competencies required to manage risk – is included as our scoping interviews suggested 11 
that risk management simply does not fit well into traditional company skill sets.  Risk 12 
knowledge management may be considered as the collection, storage and access of the data 13 
underpinning and accumulated from the broader risk management processes, i.e. the input 14 
and output data.  The latter aspect is drawn from our scoping interviews, which discussed 15 
various risk communication and reporting protocols and the use of databases for storing 16 
risk assessment outputs.  We include the former aspect on the premise that in the absence of 17 
pre-defined data requirements, risk data collection is likely to be ad hoc and largely 18 
restricted to the needs of business as usual.   19 
There was some discussion amongst the authors as to whether research and 20 
development in risk management merited inclusion as a process.  However, the pilot 21 
interviewees were resistant to this, with one considering it ‘‘not directly relevant,’’ another 22 
stating that the tools and techniques of the discipline are sufficiently developed, rendering it 23 
a secondary issue.  Although their experience within the sector confers validity to their 24 
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arguments, they may nonetheless be considered somewhat short-sighted.  A compromise 1 
was found through considering research and development not as a distinct process but as a 2 
defining characteristic of mature risk analysis, risk monitoring and risk knowledge 3 
management.  4 
 5 
5.4 KEY ATTRIBUTES 6 
We have identified eight key attributes (Fig. 3) which characterise process maturity.  7 
Scope is included as we propose maturity to be correlated with the scope of implementation 8 
(i.e. a well defined process restricted to engineering does not constitute high organisational 9 
maturity).  Here, integration refers to the existence of initiation criteria and procedures for 10 
process execution.  Although its treatment as both process and attribute constitutes double-11 
coverage, this was felt appropriate given its prominence in the practitioner and academic 12 
literature.  Verification mechanisms address procedural compliance and quality assurance 13 
of process execution, whilst validation determines whether the process itself is correct.  14 
Together, these mechanisms create process control, and provide the primary feedback 15 
inputs for organisational learning.  The inclusion of organisational learning builds on prior 16 
research conducted by the authors in offshore design and safety (Sharp et al., 2002) and 17 
reliability engineering (Strutt, 2003), although the underlying principle is drawn from ideas 18 
from the theory of action and the concept of single and double loop learning (Argyris and 19 
Schön, 1978).  It is best illustrated by paraphrasing Dalrymple (2006), who notes that 20 
experience rarely provides lessons directly, but instead requires interpretation through the 21 
filter of preconceived theories, values and prejudices.  Where these are impregnable, facts 22 
are weak things.  The capacity to use experience to question and revise these preconceived 23 
notions constitutes double loop learning.   24 
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We include stakeholder engagement in deference to its prominent representation 1 
within risk management frameworks.  However, our scoping interviews revealed a 2 
disconnect between academic and industrial perceptions of the appropriate role of external 3 
stakeholders within risk management, with the latter generally more resistant to their 4 
involvement.  Explanations to support this stance included the need to preserve commercial 5 
confidentiality, concerns over possible conflicting objectives between stakeholders and 6 
organisations, and fears that stakeholder representatives may lack specialist knowledge and 7 
hence “slow down” risk management.  One interviewee described that whilst they 8 
developed emergency response plans for water quality incidents in conjunction with the 9 
public health regulator, they were resistant to brining concerns about drinking water safety 10 
to the public domain owing to fears of press sensationalism.  Another noted that they “don’t 11 
so much consult stakeholders as expose the [risk] governance process to them [e.g. 12 
regulators or shareholder representatives] – they form an opinion of [its] adequacy or 13 
otherwise.” That said, there was agreement on the importance of engaging internal 14 
stakeholders, on the premise that through engaging other departments, functions, and 15 
business units, organisations may avoid the silo mentality which has historically pervaded 16 
risk management, thus creating synergies through shared knowledge and expertise, the co-17 
ordination of related work, etc.  For example, one interviewee described the value of using 18 
“networks of participants” to provide input to capital investment decisions.  Here, 19 
stakeholders have the opportunity to critique proposed options (e.g. for constructing a new 20 
treatment plant, staff involved in the design, operation and maintenance, costing, etc.).  The 21 
inclusion of competency as an attribute recognises that risk management processes will 22 
prove ineffective if their execution lies outwith technical or managerial skill sets.  Indeed, 23 
many of our interviewees discussed their desire to maintain in-house competencies to 24 
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manage risk in preference to relying on consultants.  Resourcing encompasses the use of 1 
monetary, human and technical (e.g. analysis methodologies) resources.  As one 2 
interviewee noted, “funding, manpower, and specialists” are particular constraints to 3 
effective risk management in smaller utilities.  Process documentation and reporting is the 4 
final attribute.  Notably, Deloach (2000) reflects that there is often a lack of organisational 5 
consistency in reporting formats for risk management, which he perceives as a barrier to 6 
“enterprise wide” risk management.  More practically, one interviewee argued that in what 7 
remains a conservative industry, if risk information is not properly documented and 8 
accessible then staff will use this ‘‘as an excuse to ignore risk management.’’   9 
Consideration was afforded to the inclusion of culture as an attribute, given its 10 
extensive discussion in the literature and our scoping interviews.  However, this was 11 
rejected for two reasons.  Firstly, culture is a notoriously difficult concept to define, let 12 
alone measure.  Secondly, overt attempts to change culture, which in this context may be 13 
thought of as the values and beliefs held by employees that guide their actions in managing 14 
risk, are not only Orwellian, but likely to be ineffectual.  Ineffectual, as the authors consider 15 
that employee values and beliefs are not intrinsic properties, but rather are conditioned by 16 
the environment within which they manage risk (i.e. the risk management processes).  17 
Thus, culture change is a consequence of process improvement, not a prerequisite.   18 
 19 
5.5 INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF PROCESS ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 20 
At the framework’s core are a series of guideline statements which describe how each 21 
process is conducted at each level of maturity with reference to the key attributes.   In 22 
support of this are process descriptions which also outline the key practices required to 23 
satisfy the process goals.  As the guideline statements are largely devolved from the 24 
 21
principles contained in the overarching maturity hierarchy, we do not dwell on their detail.  1 
However, by way of illustration, Table 1 depicts the assessment framework at levels 3 and 2 
4 for risk analysis.   3 
 4 
5.6 INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF PROCESS IMPROVEMENT FRAMEWORK 5 
This framework outlines the operational steps that utilities may take in order to 6 
implement their process improvement priorities as identified from application of the 7 
assessment framework.  It was developed after receiving feedback that the assessment 8 
framework was at a layer of abstraction which restricted its ability to inform the 9 
development of improvement plans.  The steps are grouped by process and maturity level, 10 
and are categorised according to actions to: perform base and advanced practices that 11 
satisfy the process goals (i.e. do the process); establish and define the process (i.e. structure 12 
the process); and enable and evaluate the process (i.e. institutionalise the process).  Table 2 13 
depicts the process improvement framework relating to progression from L3 to L4 in risk 14 
analysis.   15 
 16 
6. Illustrating the RM-CMM 17 
We have discussed the overarching maturity hierarchy, and introduced the risk 18 
management processes and those attributes which define their maturity.  Here, we build on 19 
these foundations by illustrating what the model practically means within various 20 
organisational functions.  Consider first risk analysis.  The distinction between the ad hoc 21 
and the repeatable level is that in the latter, the application of basic techniques by 22 
experienced staff creates a degree of stability.  In process engineering, this may entail the 23 
 22
execution of hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) to identify and assess the potential 1 
for designs to deviate from specifications, whilst at L1 this potential would be addressed 2 
implicitly if at all.  At L3, initiation points for analyses are defined (e.g. at the concept 3 
design stage), and formalised procedures detail the tasks, activities, roles and 4 
responsibilities for execution, creating a basic infrastructure that maintains the process 5 
beyond the tenure of experienced staff (who are depended upon at L2).  At L4, verification 6 
extends beyond ensuring procedural compliance (L3) to address quality assurance of 7 
analyses, for example through technical peer reviews.  Questions addressed may include: 8 
did the analysts work their way through the HAZOP study systematically, or did they 9 
overlook important scenarios, components and process flows; were all stages and operating 10 
modes of the process considered (e.g. startup, shutdown and transitioning to partial 11 
operation); and was adequate time spent on the analysis. 12 
We now consider risk based decision making in the context of occupational health 13 
and safety.  Here, the initiating point is the receipt of risk analysis outputs (e.g. job safety 14 
risk analyses, plant hazard evaluations, etc.).  These outputs, together perhaps with a 15 
predefined hierarchy of health and safety risk controls (e.g. engineering; administrative; 16 
and protective personal equipment) serve as the framework for identifying solutions to 17 
manage individual risks.  Once identified, these solutions may be evaluated with reference 18 
to criteria including: cost, feasibility and risk reduction achieved.  In contrast, at L2 19 
maturity, decisions to manage risks are taken in isolation of a clearly defined framework 20 
and perhaps even in the absence of risk analysis outputs, and are hence focus upon 21 
replicating historic good practice.  Thus, health and safety is under pressure when 22 
circumstances change, whether through the introduction of new technical processes or 23 
modifications to work practices.   24 
 23
Finally, consider education and training in risk management.  Here, a repeatable 1 
process may focus on workshops, where the concepts of risk management are introduced to 2 
staff on an as required basis, supported by on the job training.  Further, there is an absence 3 
of clear criteria dictating when and to whom training should be delivered.  An additional 4 
weakness is the inability to define the required competencies for effective risk 5 
management.  Without these, on what basis are training programmes designed, how are the 6 
appropriate means of delivery selected (e.g. classroom training, workshop, on the job, etc.), 7 
and how can the efficacy of training be evaluated?  These weaknesses are remedied at the 8 
defined state. 9 
 10 
7. Model application  11 
The RM-CMM has a range of potential applications, including:  12 
• Self-assessment or external evaluation (voluntary or audit) of risk management 13 
maturity at the corporate, business unit, functional and project level; 14 
• Use by management and technical staff as a reference model for designing and 15 
implementing a risk management improvement initiative; 16 
• Evaluation of potential suppliers’ / contractors’ / partners’ risk management maturity 17 
prior to selection. 18 
The model can be implemented either as a self-assessment procedure or by external 19 
audit using independent verification authorities. It is felt that the latter, in most cases, gives 20 
greater credence to the results of an assessment. However, internal assessments are often 21 
more useful when using the model as an improvement tool rather than as a measurement 22 
 24
tool.  The companion paper (MacGillivray et al., 2006b) describes in detail the self-1 
assessment methodology. 2 
  3 
8. Conclusions 4 
We have described a risk management capability maturity model, a vehicle for 5 
benchmarking and improving risk management within the water sector.  We have addressed 6 
the model’s theoretical and empirical foundations, overviewed its architecture, and 7 
illustrated its practical definition.  Implementation of the model should assist utilities to 8 
more effectively employ their portfolio of risk analysis techniques for optimal, credible, 9 
defensible decision making.  A companion paper describes its application to benchmark 10 
eight utilities within the international water sector. 11 
 12 
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Fig. 3. Overview of the RM-CMM (after Strutt et al., 2005).10 
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Attribute Attribute at level 3: Risk analysis Attribute at level 4: Risk analysis 
Scope A defined, documented process is in place containing criteria, methods 
and guidelines for the identification, assessment and evaluation (with 
respect to acceptance criteria) of a broad range of risks across core 
business areas, guided by a risk register.  The organisation is conversant 
with and goes beyond the regulatory requirements for risk analysis. 
A controlled process is in place containing detailed criteria, methods and 
guidelines to manage the identification, assessment, evaluation (with respect to 
acceptance criteria), establishment of causality and linking (common cause and 
dependent) of risks at all levels of the company and across all functional 
boundaries of the business, guided by a company-specific risk register. 
Integration Procedures are in place to initiate risk analysis processes. Risk analysis is initiated automatically as part of core business processes (e.g. 
periodic business risk assessments). 
Verification and 
Validation 
Basic mechanisms are in place to verify that risk analysis is performed as 
required, largely reliant on lagging indicators.  The expertise for 
validation is generally lacking. 
Verification and validation systems are in place to verify the efficiency of risk 
analysis activities and to validate their expediency (e.g. the organisation tracks 
that tools and techniques are being used correctly and that the correct tools and 




The risk analysis tool suite is reviewed and modified on an event-driven 
basis. 
Feedback is actively used to improve the execution of risk analysis (e.g. gaps 
identified and risk analysis tools and techniques improved in response). 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Risk analysis processes generally reside within the responsible unit, with 
limited cross-functional or external consultation. 
Risk analysis processes generally reside within affected disciplines, and 
stakeholders work together to define and implement an integrated approach to 
risk analysis, capitalising on synergies and collective knowledge. 
Competence Detailed knowledge of risk analysis resides only within the responsible 
unit. 
Most involved staff exhibit a good level of competence in the selection and 
application of risk analysis tools and techniques, and have access to support 
from internal or external expert risk practitioners. 
Resources Adequate resources are provided in support of risk analysis, with both 
qualitative and quantitative tools and techniques available. 
Sufficient resources are provided in support of risk analysis, a portion of which 
is made available for R + D for risk assessment.  A broad range of qualitative 
and quantitative tools and techniques are available and applied, including 
methodologies for aggregating and comparing risks. 
Documentation and 
Reporting 
Risk analysis outputs are compiled and disseminated in a format that 
supports decision making. 
Risk analysis outputs are compiled and disseminated in a clear, concise and 
actionable format that supports real-time decision making, and their reporting is 
co-ordinated with other risk reporting mechanisms (e.g. risk status updates). 
 1 
Table 1. L3 and L4 process maturity in risk analysis.2 
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• Identify and allocate sufficient resources in support of risk analysis, updating them as necessary 
to reflect changing needs. 
• Identify key internal and external stakeholders (e.g. representatives of different functions or 
divisions of the business) and define their potential contributions (e.g. synergies from collective 
knowledge and advice, etc.) and requirements (e.g. involvement in assessing cross business 
impacts). 
• Establish mechanisms to involve identified stakeholders (e.g. cross-functional working groups). 
Process 
evaluation 
• Establish formal mechanisms (e.g. periodic reviews, audits, status reports, milestones, etc.) to 
verify that risk analysis adheres to its formal description, policies, and procedures, and is being 
performed efficiently.  
• Designate ‘ownership’ of verification to a responsible individual(s). The individual(s) is 
responsible for ensuring verification is performed, reviewing the findings, and recommending 
corrective action where necessary.  Stakeholders should be involved as appropriate (e.g. staff not 
conforming to established procedures). 
• Define and collect measures to support verification of adherence and efficiency (e.g. task and 
activity checklists, cost of analyses, timeliness of analyses, etc.). 
• Establish formal mechanisms (e.g. periodic reviews, external advice, status reports, etc.) to 
validate the process of risk analysis.  Candidates for validation include the methods and 
procedures for risk analysis (e.g. the tools and techniques applied) and the risk analysis outputs 
(e.g. do the analysis outputs inform decision making). 
• Designate ‘ownership’ of validation to a responsible individual(s). The individual(s) is 
responsible for ensuring validation is performed, reviewing the findings, and recommending 
corrective action where necessary.  Stakeholders should be involved as appropriate (e.g. where 
changes to the tool suite or procedures are recommended, the process ‘owners’ would be 
involved). 
• Define and collect measures to support validation of risk analysis (e.g. internal assessments by 
decision makers of the value of risk analysis outputs, formal validation of risk analysis 
methodologies, etc.). 
• Establish mechanisms to compare in-house risk analysis with industry practice, making changes 
where appropriate (e.g. benchmarking initiatives, strategic information exchange, etc.). 
 2 
Table 2. Steps for progressing between levels 3 and 4 in risk analysis. 3 
